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In early modern times it was not uncommon for thinkers to tease out from the 
nature of God various doctrines of substantial physical and metaphysical import. 
This approach was particularly fruitful in the so-called beast-machine 
controversy, which erupted following Descartes’ claim that animals are automata, 
that is, pure machines, without a spiritual, incorporeal soul. Over the course of 
this controversy, thinkers on both sides attempted to draw out important truths 
about the status of animals simply from the notion or attributes of God. 
Automatists – led by Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Dilly – developed six 
such arguments, appealing to divine justice, providence, economy, glory (twice) 
and wisdom, while opponents to animal automatism developed two arguments, 
appealing to divine wisdom and goodness. In this paper I shall examine the 
substance of all eight of these arguments, along with their origins, patronage, and 
variations, and the objections they elicited from opponents, with the aim of 
determining their suitability for use in contemporary debates about animal 
sentience and consciousness, and hence their relevance for contemporary 
philosophers.
I. Introduction
Could important insights about animal sentience and consciousness be gleaned from 
the Judaeo-Christian notion of God? The very thought is likely to strike modern 
readers as peculiar, so accustomed are we to thinking that only certain kinds of 
evidence (typically empirical and conceptual) is admissible in debates about whether 
animals are conscious or are capable of thought. Consequently, even those 
philosophers with deeply-held theological beliefs – and there are many – are unlikely 
to try to determine fundamental facts about the nature of animals through an 
examination of the notion of God. Yet in the early modern period, when similar 
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questions about animal sentience and cognition were raised as part of the so-called 
beast-machine controversy, this is precisely what a number of philosophers sought to 
do; that is, they sought to establish facts about the nature of animals through 
arguments based on the notion of the Judaeo-Christian God. An account of these 
arguments would be interesting and worthwhile in its own right, not least because 
most of them have somehow escaped the notice of even the best chroniclers of the 
beast-machine controversy.1 But such an account may serve an additional purpose, 
by presenting these arguments as potentially relevant contributions to the cognate 
debates of today. In many cases, of course, philosophical arguments do not age well: 
arguments seen as relevant and compelling in one period of history are often seen as 
neither when considered from the standpoint of another age, which may use different 
philosophical frameworks and different terminology, and may even have different 
concerns altogether. But while this may serve as a general rule, arguments drawn 
from the nature of the Judaeo-Christian God may be a clear exception to it, because 
among Western philosophers the nature of the Judaeo-Christian God has remained 
broadly stable. That is, the typical early modern characterisation of the Judaeo-
Christian God, as an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, eternal, omnipresent 
spirit, accords with that often professed today. It is therefore reasonable to suppose 
that early modern arguments based on the notion of God may have retained their 
force, and relevance, for contemporary philosophers who belong to the Judaeo-
Christian tradition. This raises the question: can these arguments serve as a useful 
resource for such philosophers today? Further, if the arguments are good, are those 
who endorse the Judaeo-Christian notion of God thereby committed to a particular 
answer in the debates about animal minds? To answer these questions we need to 
examine the arguments in greater detail. This shall be the chief purpose of this paper.
II. The beast-machine controversy
In order to put these arguments into context, a few words about the early modern 
beast-machine controversy are in order. At the heart of the controversy was the 
question of whether animals had souls, as had traditionally been believed by 
philosophers and layman alike in medieval and renaissance times, or whether they 
were mere automata, as Descartes proposed in his Discourse on Method (1637).2 In 
that work Descartes cleaved creation into two separate realms, one of corporeal 
substance (body, matter, extended thing), the other of spiritual substance (mind, soul, 
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thinking thing), and argued that human beings straddled both, being composites of 
soul and body.3 Descartes did not extend this privilege to animals on the grounds that 
their actions could be adequately explained on the supposition that they followed 
naturally from the arrangements of animals’ bodily organs in the same way that a 
watch’s actions followed naturally from the configuration of its component parts. In 
other words, animals were pure machines, without a spiritual, incorporeal soul.4 Nor 
was this a lack of an unimportant metaphysical extra, for as Descartes located all 
thinking, understanding and reasoning in the incorporeal soul, the very thing animals 
lacked, it followed that animals were without any kind of mental activity. 
Subscribers to animal automatism typically endorsed Descartes’ line on this, and so 
seriously did they take their commitment to rejecting all mental activity in animals 
that many automatists, in addition to offering direct proofs of the beast-machine 
hypothesis, often fought for it indirectly as well, by attempting to show that animals 
did not think, or reason, or even experience sensations (all of which required a soul). 
Opponents, likewise, often sought to overturn animal automatism by showing that 
animals can and do engage in such mental activities.
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, those on both sides of the beast-machine debate 
routinely appealed to empirical justifications in support of their respective positions. 
By ‘empirical’ I mean not just observation and experiment, of which there was 
surprisingly little performed by those on either side of the debate, but also those 
arguments and claims based on common sense, or which appealed to intuitions. 
Many of the skirmishes here concerned animal behaviour, and in particular so-called 
animal sagacity and cunning, that is, the apparently intelligent behaviour displayed 
by certain animals.5 Automatists urged that such behaviour could be explained 
mechanistically,6 while opponents insisted that it could not. By way of support, 
automatists drew detailed analogies between the actions of animals and those of 
human-made automata, such as the water-driven mechanisms of Saint-Germain-en-
Laye,7 while their opponents drew detailed analogies between the actions of animals 
and those of humans.8 Other skirmishes centred on physiology. Opponents of 
automatism pointed to the anatomical similarities between humans and animals, 
claiming that similar organs suggested similar ‘internal principles’ as well, i.e. 
souls,9 while automatists stressed the dissimilarities between human and animal 
organs, especially the brain.10
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Aside from these empirical justifications, those involved in the beast-machine 
debate also developed a variety of a priori arguments to defend their respective 
positions. The majority of these arguments were theological in nature, and can be 
divided into arguments from (a) Christian doctrine, and (b) the nature of God. In 
truth there was really only the one argument from Christian doctrine, and that 
concerned immortality. To grant animals a soul (went the argument) is to grant them 
immortality also, for all souls, being incorporeal, are indestructible, having no parts 
into which they can be broken up. But to grant animals immortality was 
theologically disastrous, destroying as it did the uniqueness of man.11 Such an 
unwelcome consequence could be avoided (so the thinking went) only by endorsing 
animal automatism.12 This argument was put forward by Descartes in 1646 and 
subsequently rehearsed by many of his followers.13 In addition to this argument from 
Christian doctrine, there were also numerous arguments from the nature of God: six 
in favour of animal automatism, and two against.14 So potent were these arguments 
taken to be that most of those who engaged in the beast-machine controversy 
sponsored at least one of them. In what follows we shall examine the substance of 
these arguments, along with their origins, patronage, and variations, and the 
objections they elicited from opponents. We start with the six arguments advanced in 
favour of the beast-machine, and shall consider them in chronological order of 
development.
III. The argument from divine justice
The first and by far the most popular argument for animal automatism drawn from 
God’s nature was the argument introduced by Nicolas Poisson in 1670 in the 
following syllogism:
Without violating the laws of his justice, God cannot produce a creature 
subject to pain and capable of suffering which had not deserved it
Now, animals having a soul, are subject to pain and are capable of 
suffering without having deserved it
Therefore, without violating the laws of his justice, God was not able to 
create an animal with a soul.15
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I shall term this the argument from divine justice. The major premise of this 
argument, Poisson claims, is drawn from Augustine’s principle that ‘neque enim sub 
justo Deo, miser esse quisquam, nisi mereatur, potest’ [under a just God there cannot 
be anyone wretched unless he deserves it], from which the Saint had drawn the 
doctrine of original sin (on the basis that, if God is just, then any human suffering 
must be deserved, and since every human suffers, no human can be innocent of sin, 
even children).16 As for the minor premise, it was often noted that the principal 
explanation for God’s permission of human suffering, namely punishment for sin, 
could not be extended to account for animal suffering since, unlike humans, animals 
are incapable of sin, and of even knowing God, let alone hating him or disobeying 
him. In short, there was no animal fall (and it would hardly be just for animals to be 
punished because of man’s fall). From the combination of the two premises it 
followed not that animals with souls were impossible per se, but that it was not 
possible for God to create them on account of his perfect justice.
A central assumption in this argument (and which is only partly explicit in 
the minor premise) is that pain and suffering can be experienced only by creatures 
with souls. This was, as it happens, a view widely shared by automatists and anti-
automatists alike. Near the end of his life Descartes famously asserted to Henry 
More that he had denied ‘sensation to no animal, in so far as it depends on a bodily 
organ’;17 in other words, he accepted that the physiological conditions for sensation 
were present in animals, inasmuch as they possessed sense organs which, when 
triggered, excited their nerves, agitated their animal spirits etc., but that the 
phenomenological experiences of sensation (e.g. the feeling of a pain) were absent 
on account of being mental events which thus required the existence of a soul.18 
Automatists tended to adopt this position, or some close variation of it (as we shall 
see later), and so generally denied that animals were capable of sensation understood 
phenomenologically, while opponents of automatism routinely argued that animals 
were so capable. Therefore, in framing the argument from divine justice Poisson was 
entitled to assume that pain and suffering can be experienced only by creatures with 
souls, as it was a claim that his opponents would have granted him.
After Poisson, the argument from divine justice quickly became a staple of 
animal automatists, being rehearsed by thinkers such as André Martin (1671),19 
Nicolas Malebranche (1674-5, 1682, 1696),20 Antoine Dilly (1676),21 Jean 
Darmanson (1684),22 John Norris (1704),23 Isaac Jaquelot (1705),24 and others. It 
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even appeared in verse form in the work of Louis Racine (1728).25 The perceived 
strength of the argument can be gleaned not just from its prevalence in the work of 
animal automatists, but also in the amount of fire it drew from opponents. One of the 
more notable responses was made by Pierre Bayle (1702). His most serious charge 
was that the supporters of the argument from divine justice were in danger of 
overturning a key doctrine of Christianity. In making this claim he supposes as given 
(a) that animals are innocent, (b) that animals suffer, and notes that together they 
undermine the sub justo Deo principle, which he expresses as ‘that which has never 
sinned cannot suffer evil.’26 The undermining of the sub justo Deo principle is 
unwelcome inasmuch as it underpins the doctrine of original sin, and in any case 
‘follows necessarily from the ideas we have of the justice and goodness of God,’27 so 
it is not something that a right-thinking Christian could plausibly question, let alone 
discard. The power of Bayle’s objections often lies in their rigour, but in the case of 
this objection rigour is not enough to make it compelling, for it could only feasibly 
sway those automatists prepared to grant him that animals suffer, which ex hypothesi 
none of them was likely to do.
In the decades that followed Bayle’s attack, other opponents of automatism 
also felt moved to address the argument from divine justice. Typically, those who 
did so believed that the most effective response was to offer a clear, plausible 
explanation of how animal suffering could be reconciled with God’s justice. 
Attempts at such an explanation were invariably brief and amounted to much less 
than a fully developed animal theodicy (avant la lettre). In his Essai Philosophique  
sur l’ame des bêtes (1728/1737), David Boullier insisted that God’s creation of 
animals with souls, and which are therefore capable of suffering, does not tell against 
his justice, which would only be impugned if he had created wretched creatures, that 
is, creatures for whom it would be better, all things considered, not to have existed at 
all. But God ensures that no innocent creature (i.e. animal) is ever reduced to this 
state.28 Five years later, in his defence of animal souls, Jean-Pierre de Crousaz (1733) 
insisted that animals ‘do not suffer much’; this is partly because they lack the ability 
to reflect on their lot, and partly because God has so constructed them as to ensure 
that whatever disagreeable sensations they do experience are as nothing in 
comparison to the pleasures they get from the agreeable ones, which are more 
enduring and experienced more frequently.29 Displaying an even greater penchant for 
speculation, Guillaume-Hyacinthe Bougeant claimed in his notorious Amusement  
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philosophique sur le langage des bestes (1739) that the suffering of animals is just 
because it is deserved.30 He conjectured that the souls of devils which freely sinned 
against God were punished by being imprisoned in the bodies of animals, wherein 
they have no freedom and a much reduced capacity for rationality. Thus ‘every beast 
is a devil united to an organized body,’31 and on account of their guilt animals 
deserve whatever suffering befalls them. Although Bougeant’s work was well-
known, and much discussed, few took it seriously. In 1749 Jean-Antoine Guer, the 
first chronicler of the beast-machine debate, openly stated in his survey that 
Bougeant’s position was so ludicrous it did not need to be refuted.32 The fact that the 
argument from divine justice elicited such poor quality responses from opponents 
perhaps goes some way towards explaining the widespread popularity it enjoyed 
amongst automatists, which exceeded that of any other argument from the divine 
nature to animal automatism.
IV. The argument from divine providence
The second such argument to be developed was initially put forward by Nicolas 
Malebranche in his Search after Truth (1674-5). This argument – henceforth referred 
to as the argument from divine providence – begins with the recognition that all 
animal actions display regularity, and that regularity signifies intelligence. There is 
thus a need to posit a principle of intelligence behind animal actions, and here two 
options are available: first, a principle of intelligence internal to the animal itself, as 
would be the operation of an animal’s understanding or reason; or second, a principle 
external to the animal, namely God.33 Malebranche endorsed the second option on 
the grounds that the first leads to absurdity: if we were to admit a principle of 
intelligence in animals ‘then we should have to say that there is more intelligence in 
the smallest of animals, or even in a single seed, than in the most spiritual of men.’34 
This is so because animals are more orderly in their behaviour than are humans, 
inasmuch as they are less likely to deviate from a particular pattern of behaviour. But 
such a consequence of attributing intelligence to animals is absurd, which means that 
attributing intelligence to animals is itself absurd. And since there is a principle of 
intelligence, it must lie outside animals, in fact in the creator, the one who has 
constructed the bodies of animals.
This argument from divine providence proved very popular among 
subsequent automatists, though many favoured a reworked version based around the 
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stock examples of so-called animal sagacity which were continually rehearsed in the 
literature of the time, e.g. the hound which, finding three possible paths in front of it 
and no scent of its quarry down two of them, opts for the third as if deducing it 
syllogistically; the hind which hides her fawn downwind to thwart pursuing hounds; 
the spider which spins an intricate web to trap flies etc.35 Once these or similar 
examples of animal sagacity had been laid out, the argument proceeded as per the 
version developed by Malebranche, i.e. by positing that there were two possible 
explanations for the behaviour described, namely that animals have 
understanding/reason, and therefore a soul, or that God had providentially fashioned 
an organic machine of such complexity and subtlety that it could behave in such 
ways without the need of a soul and its attendant psychological life. This is the 
version of the argument from providence that we find in John Norris (1704),36 
François Fénélon (1712),37 and others such as Abbé Macy (1737).38
It is worthwhile noting that at the conclusion of the argument, when 
attempting to describe the mechanism by which God conducts and directs animal 
behaviour, Fénélon reaches for the notion of instinct, as indeed did many who 
endorsed the argument from providence. For Fénélon, instinct was simply a natural, 
spontaneous impulse to act in a way conducive to survival, which God instilled in 
animals via dispositions. Most who utilised the notion of instinct in this context 
likewise understood it naturalistically,39 but others opted to interpret it as something 
almost supernatural. For example, in 1711 Joseph Addison remarked that the 
principle at work in animals ‘cannot be termed Reason’ and was instead instinct, 
which he took to be ‘the immediate direction of Providence, and such an operation of 
the supreme Being, as that which determines all the portions of matter to their proper 
centres.’40 One person who would have baulked at the suggestion that God’s 
providence was manifest through animals’ instincts was the originator of the 
argument from divine providence, Nicolas Malebranche, who held that instincts were 
nothing more than innate desires to obtain pleasant sensations and avoid unpleasant 
ones. For Malebranche, of course, animals have no mental life,41 and therefore no 
desires, or sensations (pleasurable or otherwise), and their want of these things 
thereby disqualifies them from having instincts also.
However it was couched, many thinkers were led to affirm in animals an 
exquisitely detailed mechanism that was able to produce complex behaviours not 
dissimilar to some of those witnessed in thinking beings. The fact that their soulless 
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frames had been so arranged as to enable them to live and thrive despite the apparent 
handicap of being without thought was testimony to the craftsmanship of God. ‘Our 
system,’ wrote the Cartesian Abbé Macy, ‘affords a magnificent idea of the wisdom 
and the providence of the Creator.’42 As such, it was grist to the mill of the natural 
theology movement, which saw the hand (and thus the existence) of God in the order 
and purpose of natural phenomena such as the structure of animal bodies. 
V. The argument from divine economy
Needless to say, not all pro-automatism arguments were able to benefit from an 
association with such a prominent movement, nor could all boast such an illustrious 
parentage as that enjoyed by the argument from divine justice (coming as it did from 
the hand of Malebranche). As if to underscore this fact, the next three pro-
automatism arguments to be advanced had much humbler origins, being the product 
of a thinker whom history has, fairly or otherwise, consigned to relative obscurity, 
namely Antoine Dilly, a priest at Ambrun.43 His De l’âme des bêtes (1676) was one 
of the first book-length works in favour of animal automatism. Although practically 
unknown now, it was widely read and cited by his contemporaries. In the book, Dilly 
presents a suite of arguments for the beast-machine hypothesis, many of his own 
devising. Among them is the following three-step argument, which I shall term the 
argument from divine economy:
God has the power to create anything which does not imply a contradiction
God is able to make an animal automaton, that is, he has the power to make 
a body similar in every way to that of a monkey, and which behaves 
exactly as a monkey does simply by virtue of its organs and nothing more 
(i.e. no soul).
God ‘always acts by means of the shortest way, and never employs 4 where 
2 would suffice; so much so that the body alone with a certain arrangement 
of its parts having been sufficient for the production of the most regular 
actions of animals, one has to conclude that they do not have any knowing 
soul.’44
Dilly entitles this ‘Another proof that beasts do not have knowledge, drawn from 
God’s power,’45 but this is rather misleading, inasmuch as although the argument 
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begins with claims about God’s power, the focus in the key third step shifts away 
from God’s power and onto his wisdom. To claim that God always acts via the 
shortest way is to make a claim about the means God uses to bring about his ends;46 
it is, in fact, to state that God acts wisely, inasmuch as he acts economically, not 
acting in vain by taking unnecessary steps. This is not to say that wisdom consists 
entirely in acting economically; indeed, in Francis Hutcheson’s felicitous 
formulation, ‘Wisdom denotes the pursuing of the best Ends by the best Means.’47 
The claim that God’s wisdom would manifest itself not just in his choice of ends, but 
also in his choice of means to those ends, was one found often in the work of many 
17th/18th century thinkers, and associated particularly with Malebranche, Leibniz, and 
Wolff,48 though each applied it in the field of theodicy rather than animal 
automatism; consequently none of them developed the claim into the argument from 
divine economy, as Dilly did in 1676. The argument invites us to suppose that it 
would have been entirely unnecessary for God to create animal souls, as ex 
hypothesi animal bodies alone are capable of producing the range of behaviour God 
wanted. Consequently a wise God would have created animal automata.
The argument from divine economy was endorsed by a number of later 
automatists, such as Jean Darmanson (1684),49 and the Benedictine Cartesian 
philosopher François Lamy (1698), who argued that we are assured that God did not 
give souls to beasts
if we have any idea of his wisdom, for since it belongs to this wisdom to do 
nothing unnecessarily, and to achieve his ends by the shortest ways, would 
it not have been contrary to this simplicity to give to beasts, in order for 
them to execute their movements, a soul which would not have had any 
connection or relationship with them, a soul without which it is 
acknowledged that they would have been to execute everything just as 
regularly?50
Similarly, in 1700 François Bayle (no relation to Pierre) urged that
God does nothing in vain, he does not at any time use superfluous means 
for his ends, for that is incompatible with his wisdom, which works in the 
simplest manner and proceeds in the shortest way, and consequently there 
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is in beasts no principle distinct from the structure of the body, for it would 
be superfluous, seeing that beasts can perform all their functions without 
it.51
In each case the thrust of the argument remains the same. That the argument was not 
changed or developed, merely iterated, is likely due to the fact that opponents to 
animal automatism did not challenge the argument’s form, or even its key claim that 
God always acts by the simplest/shortest ways.
VI. The argument from divine glory #1
The lack of a direct response to the argument from divine economy is noteworthy, 
not least because it was rehearsed in works that were widely read and cited, most 
notably Dilly’s De l’âme des bêtes. In that work Dilly sketched out two further 
arguments in favour of the beast-machine hypothesis, neither of which drew a 
response from opponents. Both of these overlooked arguments were based on the 
notion of divine glory. In the first, which I shall prosaically term the argument from 
divine glory #1, Dilly begins with the assertion that when considering God’s works 
we need to keep in mind that they were made for his glory. With regard to the 
creation of animals, Dilly then asserts: ‘it is certain that we conceive that the 
construction of an automaton similar to a beast, in which there is no knowing soul, 
requires more artifice, more wisdom, and more power in the worker for the 
arrangement of so many different parts, for their mutual proportion, and lastly for the 
production of so many different movements which are so in keeping with the 
conservation of the automaton’ than is involved in producing a beast endowed with a 
soul, which could attend to its own conservation.52 In the same way, we would form 
a grander idea of the craftsman who constructed a boat which was able to lower its 
own sails when necessary, steer itself away from reefs and sandbanks, and make 
whatever other adjustments are necessary, than we would of the craftsman who 
builds an ordinary ship which requires a pilot to do all of these things.53 François 
Bayle concurred, insisting that the creation of animals able to attend to their own 
conservation and to carry out all their functions through the structure and 
interconnection of parts better attested to God’s glory that the creation of animals 
with ‘some knowing principle,’54 i.e. a soul. There is some overlap between this 
argument and the argument from divine economy, in that both appeal to God’s 
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wisdom. However the argument from divine economy appeals only to that, whereas 
the argument from divine glory #1 appeals not just to God’s wisdom, but also to his 
artifice and power.
VII. The argument from divine glory #2
The second argument from divine glory (#2), this time in the reductio ad absurdum 
vein, is to be found in inchoate form in Dilly’s book, where he writes:
it is inconceivable that God be able to create a substance capable of 
knowing and loving except in order to make it know and love him; as a 
result, if animals are capable of knowledge and love, we should say that 
God unceasingly turns them towards him in order to make them love him 
and to make them know him, which seems to have rather unfortunate 
consequences.55
Dilly does not say what these consequences are, an oversight that robs the argument 
of both punch and clarity. Possibly he had in mind those later identified by fellow 
automatist Jean Darmanson (1684); according to Darmanson, to allow that animals 
are capable of knowledge and love, yet not capable of knowing and loving God, 
results in a chain of unacceptable theological consequences – it first undermines the 
doctrine of original sin, and then the doctrine of the trinity, the divinity of Christ, and 
even scripture itself! Much of Darmanson’s extended (and often quite rambling) 
treatment of the argument is devoted to showing how all of these consequences are 
‘derived necessarily from the common opinion concerning the knowledge of 
beasts.’56 To understand how the argument works, we need to suppose, along with 
opponents of animal automatism, that it would be correct to say (for example) that a 
dog knows its master, and loves to eat and drink etc., yet it neither knows nor loves 
its God. If we also suppose, along with opponents of animal automatism, that the dog 
has a soul, then two possible explanations are open to us:
Either this soul is in order or else it is in disorder: it is not in disorder since 
it is such as it left God’s hands, so it is in order; therefore God exempts it 
from the laws of his knowledge and his love, therefore God does not love 
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himself necessarily with an infinite love, and does not have an infinite zeal 
for his glory.57
Unfortunately the compressed presentation of Darmanson’s argument serves only to 
impede its intelligibility. At least the first part of it is clear enough: if animals have 
souls capable of knowledge and love, but not capable of knowing and loving God, 
then this is how these souls must have left God’s hands (there has, after all, been no 
animal fall). God thus must have created animal souls at the outset to know and love 
only the physical; moreover, he must have done so deliberately. He thus permits 
them to know and love only the physical. Darmanson then suggests that from a 
theological standpoint this is problematic, because this is precisely what has been 
forbidden to humans: the common theological belief is that when our horizons do not 
extend beyond the physical, we are in disorder, i.e. at odds with God’s plans. Indeed, 
this is enshrined in the traditional conception of sin as aversio a Deo et conversio ad 
creaturam: [sin is] a turning away from God and turning towards something created. 
This gives rise to something of a puzzle: on the one hand, the standard theological 
account holds that God did not create humans in the state in which they now find 
themselves, in which they routinely eschew the spiritual (God) in favour of the 
physical; indeed, he could not have created humans that way, as he acts only for the 
sake of his own glory. That humans are now in that state is a result of Adam’s fall. 
On the other hand, opponents of animal automatism would have us believe that God 
created animals in such a state of innocent submission to the physical, the very state 
that theologians tell us God could not have created humans. This leads Darmanson to 
say of the hypothesis which grants souls to animals,
If that is true … one must say goodbye to all the reasons the church has 
always used to prove original sin; the corruption of nature by 
concupiscence and the necessity of a mediator, since it can happen that our 
nature is not in disorder, God having been able to create it in the state in 
which we see it: Therefore God can exempt us from the laws of his love 
and permit us sin; therefore he does not necessarily love himself with an 
infinite love, which would not permit him this exemption; therefore the 
mystery of the trinity based on this principle is only illusion and phantom; 
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therefore Jesus Christ can pass as an imposter, and Holy Scripture as a 
paradox.58
Darmanson’s argument was sympathetically outlined by Pierre Bayle in his review 
of Darmanson’s book for the inaugural issue of the journal Nouvelles de la 
République des lettres (1684).59 Bayle’s review of Darmanson was widely read, yet 
in spite of the extra publicity the second argument from divine glory was rarely 
endorsed afterwards. As far as I can tell, its last deployment occurred in 1700, in the 
work of François Bayle, who noted the difficulty we would have
to believe that God has ever produced any substance capable of knowledge 
and love which neither knows nor loves him. And therefore if we concede 
that beasts know, we have to concede that they know and love God, which 
is absurd in every philosophy and impious to Christians.60
This recalls Dilly’s version of the argument; apparently François Bayle either did not 
read, or was not influenced by, either Darmanson or his more famous namesake, 
Pierre.
VIII. The argument from divine wisdom
The sixth and final argument for animal automatism drawn from the nature of God is 
to be found in one of Malebranche’s lesser known works, the Defense de l’auteur de 
la Recherche de la verité, contre l’accusation de Mr. de la Ville (1684). This 
argument aims to show that granting souls to animals conflicts with God’s wisdom, 
and as such cannot be justified. I shall accordingly term it the argument from divine 
wisdom. It begins with the uncontroversial observation that a swallow eats a huge 
number of flies. Now if these flies are supposed to have been endowed with souls, 
then we are led to suppose, claims Malebranche, that ‘an innumerable number of 
souls [sc. those of flies] are annihilated in order to conserve the bodies of these 
birds.’ The trouble with this is that ‘the soul of a fly is better than the body of the 
most perfect of animals.’ This is because soul is by its very nature a more noble 
substance than matter. ‘Therefore, if one affirms that beasts have souls, that is, 
substances more noble than bodies, one deprives God of wisdom, and makes him act 
without order.’61 A crucial assumption of this argument is that when an animal dies 
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its soul is annihilated by God; Malebranche was well aware that few were likely to 
challenge this assumption (and indeed, most of those who did grant souls to animals 
explicitly affirmed that God annihilated those souls at the point of death). But the 
argument from divine wisdom does not draw its strength from the fact that God 
annihilates all animal souls, or at least an inordinate number of them, but rather from 
the puzzling disparity between the fate of animal souls and that of animal bodies. 
Animal souls, despite being the nobler of the two substances, are annihilated, while 
the inferior animal bodies are not, for although the bodies eventually break down 
into their component parts, these parts are not annihilated. This stress on the nobility 
of the substances, and the oddity involved in supposing that God might preserve the 
lesser while destroying the greater, is brought out more clearly in Pierre Bayle’s brief 
treatment of the argument in his Historical and Critical Dictionary (1702):
According to common opinion, the souls of beasts are annihilated the 
instant the beasts cease to live. Where then is God’s constancy? He creates 
souls and soon he destroys them. He does not do the same thing with 
regard to matter, for he never destroys it. He therefore conserves the less 
perfect substances and destroys the more perfect. Is this acting like a wise 
agent?62
Bayle suggests that the difficulty is removed by Descartes’ opinion that beasts are 
machines, though ultimately this was not enough to convert him to Descartes’ view.
It is uncertain whether the authorship of the argument from divine wisdom 
should be credited to Malebranche; a case can be made in favour of Jean Darmanson, 
who included what could be considered an inchoate version of it in his La bête  
transformée en machine, published early in 1684:
It is in keeping with God’s wisdom to make nothing useless in nature, and 
not to sacrifice in the service of the body the souls of an infinity of animals, 
which are much more excellent than the noblest of all bodies.63
Interestingly, in the review of Darmanson’s book, also from 1684, Bayle saw 
Darmanson as making two distinct arguments here; first, that if animals have souls, 
and God annihilates these souls, then ‘God destroys his own work, which is a mark 
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of inconstancy,’ and second, that if God annihilates souls but not bodies then he 
‘preserves the less perfect substances while annihilating the more perfect, which is 
not in keeping with a wise agent.’64 The second of these is a fair summary of the 
argument from wisdom as Darmanson outlines it; the first is a separate argument, 
and one that Darmanson does not make.
IX. The argument from superfluous organs
Our examination now turns to those arguments, again based on the nature of God, 
that were advanced against the beast-machine hypothesis. As noted earlier, there 
were two of these, and I shall call them the argument from superfluous organs, and 
the argument from deception. Both were developed by Ignace Pardies in his 
Discours de la connoissance des bestes (1672). The first of the two arguments has its 
roots in Pardies’ remark that
It would be a very strange thing, and scarcely in keeping with the infinite 
wisdom that we notice in the works of nature, if it had taken the trouble to 
form eyes and ears which served only for outward show, and not for seeing 
or for hearing.65
The somewhat tentative argument made here was subsequently adopted, and indeed 
sharpened up, by various opponents to animal automatism, though Voltaire’s 
delivery from 1733 is undoubtedly the clearest and punchiest:
It seems to me almost proven that animals are not simply machines. Here is 
my proof: God gave them precisely the same organs of sense as ours; thus, 
if they feel no sensations, God has made something useless. Now God, you 
claim, does nothing in vain; thus He cannot have made so many organs of 
sense if they were not capable of sensation; therefore animals cannot be 
purely machines.66
In response, it was often noted by automatists that on their hypothesis organs such as 
eyes, ears and noses are integral parts of the bodily mechanism, and indeed the 
instruments through which external objects can produce certain effects on the body, 
and for that reason could not be written off as useless. This point formed the core of 
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what became the stock response to the argument from superfluous organs, though the 
response itself was often nuanced by one’s understanding of the mechanics of 
sensation, or at least by the way one opted to describe them. Antoine Le Grand, for 
example, identified three degrees of sensation: the first degree is the mere 
stimulation of corporeal sense organs by external things, and the consequent 
excitement of various nerves, while the second degree occurs when this stimulation 
is transferred to ‘the pineal gland, or seat of the soul,’67 which causes perceptions (in 
the incorporeal mind) such as pain, hunger and thirst. The third degree involves a 
judgement about the perceptions of the second degree, e.g. an affirmation that an 
object is such-and-such a colour.68 This distinction draws credence, Le Grand avers, 
from Isaiah 6.9 (‘Keep on listening, but do not perceive; Keep on looking, but do not 
understand’), though it can be proved adequately enough from our own experience, 
since there are times when our eyes are open yet we do not really see what is in front 
of us as our attention is elsewhere, which suggests a difference between the mere 
stimulation of sense organs and the richer experience of true sensation.69 With this 
distinction in hand, Le Grand proceeds to argue that animals are capable of only the 
first (mechanical) degree of sensation, but that they have need of organs such as 
eyes, ears and noses for that. Thus these organs are not useless to animals even on 
the automatist’s hypothesis.
Other animal automatists made a similar point while glossing the process of 
sensation in a slightly different way. Antoine Dilly (1676), for example, identified 
four stages in the process of seeing to which he thought the term ‘sensation’ could 
meaningfully be applied:
(1) the image an object makes on the retina
(2) what is transmitted to the brain by the vibrations of the retinal threads caused 
by (1)
(3) the movements of the animal spirits produced by (2)
(4) an awareness and confused thought of the object70
According to Dilly, the first three stages occur in animals, and all four only in 
humans. While Le Grand and Dilly differed in their understanding of the physical 
processes involved in sensation, or at least in the way they described them, they were 
united not only by their acceptance of the dualistic framework, the separation of 
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nature into the two distinct substances of body and soul, but also by their conviction 
that the process of sensation is one that starts in the (corporeal) body and ends in the 
(incorporeal) soul, and so crosses from one realm or domain to the other. Both, 
moreover, were agreed that only the corporeal processes involved in sensation took 
place in animals, but that recognition of this was enough to take the sting out of the 
argument from superfluous organs. The responses of other animal automatists to this 
argument follow the same pattern as found in Le Grand and Dilly, with the only 
variation being in the way the corporeal component of sensation was understood, or 
described.71 Even Gabriel Daniel, one of the fiercest critics of Cartesianism and the 
beast-machine hypothesis, considered the response adequate, admitting in 1702 that 
animal sense organs could not be considered useless even on the hypothesis that 
animals are automata.72
X. The argument from deception
The second argument from the nature of God against animal automatism was also 
developed by Ignace Pardies in 1672; I shall call it the argument from deception. The 
central principle behind this argument is that if someone makes us think something 
which turns out not to be true, then they deceive us. Pardies uses the example of a 
puppeteer, who can be said to deceive us inasmuch as he presents us with a puppet 
that looks, acts, and talks like us, and so naturally leads us to conclude that the 
puppet is human, when it is in fact not so. There would be a similar kind of 
deception involved if animals turn out to be machines, claims Pardies. For when we 
consider those actions which beasts and humans perform in a similar way,
we judge from the outset that they happen in beasts just as in ourselves, 
with knowledge and with feeling. So if all these beasts were only pure 
machines, what could we say of the one who presents them to us and who 
makes them perform before us like puppets?73
Pardies’ rather rambling presentation obscures the form of his argument, which 
ultimately seems to be this: We know God is perfectly good, which means (among 
other things) that he does not deceive us; yet God would deceive us if animals were 
pure machines, therefore they cannot be so. Pardies does not seek to defend the 
major premise, though given that the very notion of a deceiving God was so 
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emphatically ruled out by Descartes in his Meditations,74 it is unlikely he would have 
come under any pressure from the Cartesians to do so. Instead, Pardies’ main 
concern is to establish the reasonableness of the minor premise, which he does via 
the parallel examples of the puppet and animals. In both scenarios, Pardies holds that 
the mistaken belief (that puppets are human/that animals have souls) arises as a 
result of a clear intention to deceive (on the part of the puppeteer in the first case, of 
God in the second). The point is far from compelling in itself (do puppeteers really 
intend to deceive us?), and not surprisingly those who saw enough promise in the 
argument from deception to endorse it themselves did not present Pardies’ 
formulation of it. John Ray (1693), for example, opted for rhetoric over rigour:
Wouldn’t God seem to have duped the human race if, instead of living 
animals having their own internal principle of motion (as men have 
believed until now), he had filled the world only with as it were dolls or 
little images completely destitute of any life and sense?75
Behind such thinking, Ray believed, was the human prejudice that the world was 
created for man alone:
If this is true, it is doubtless why man elevates himself and takes pride in 
himself, and rightly boasts that this world was founded for his cause alone, 
for it does not seem that there would be any further use for it if men were 
wiped out or moved elsewhere.76
Ray’s formulation of the argument from deception is much looser than Pardies’, and 
arguably it does not benefit from the rhetorical flourishes he gives it, though he is 
surely right that one of the chief motivations for holding the beast-doctrine was that 
it raised man above animals.
Those animal automatists who sought to respond to the argument took issue 
with the assumption – found in all versions of the argument – that if we are mistaken 
in supposing animals to have souls then God would be a deceiver. Antoine Dilly, 
responding in 1676 to Pardies’ version of the argument, insisted instead that if we 
are mistaken in this way then the fault would be one that should be laid at our feet 
rather than God’s. Dilly argued that ideas represent to us things in a certain way, and 
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if it were to turn out that these things are otherwise than as our ideas represent them 
to be, then God would be at fault (because all ideas come from him).77 But, Dilly 
continues, we are able to make judgements about things that we do not know all that 
well, or have not investigated fully, and if it turns out that we make erroneous 
judgements in such situations (e.g. judging that the earth stands still because it 
appears not to move) then the fault lies with us, for making judgements prematurely, 
before all the facts are in. In the case at hand, Dilly asserts that it cannot obviously 
be the case that animals think, feel, or have souls because these are matters disputed 
by philosophers, and are bound up with thorny metaphysical questions such as 
whether matter can think.
Abbé Macy (1737) also took the argument from deception very seriously. 
Like Dilly, Macy was keen to stress the point that the beast-machine hypothesis itself 
implies no deception on God’s part: ‘It is not God who makes you believe that they 
[beasts] have a soul capable of knowing; the fact is that your prejudice makes you 
regard as evident what is contrary to reason.’78 More ambitious was Macy’s attempt 
to turn the argument from deception on its head by arguing that God would be a 
deceiver not if animal automatism turned out to be true, as Pardies believed, but if it 
turned out to be false: ‘if beasts had a soul capable of knowing,’ Macy argues, ‘God 
would be deceiving me, for I cannot convince myself that beasts know without at the 
same time thinking that some of them think much better than men.’79 The bee, for 
example, makes honey without ever having been taught how, while humans require 
instruction to do what they do; further, the bee needs no mathematical instruments to 
create a hexagonal honeycomb, yet no humans are natural mathematicians. 
Ultimately Macy’s response draws whatever strength it has not by linking the thesis 
of animal souls with a deceiving God (a link that is far from adequately forged), but 
by showing that the thesis of animal souls is apt to challenge our belief in human 
uniqueness; for if we grant a thinking soul to animals then we are forced to grant that 
(some) animals are better at (some kinds of) thinking than we are, which in turn puts 
strain on the idea that humans are special, an idea that even those opposed to the 
beast-machine hypothesis had no wish to question since it had, after all, been 
vouchsafed by God.
XI. Conclusion
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Macy’s defence of the beast-machine hypothesis was not only spirited, as should be 
clear enough, but somewhat poignant also, inasmuch as near the beginning of his 
Traité de l’ame des bêtes (1737) he all but concedes that the battle over the beast-
machine was already lost, since ‘All philosophers, or at least the majority,’ now 
endorsed animal souls.80 This was in fact a fair assessment. By 1737, the beast-
machine hypothesis attracted little support among the philosophical community, and 
its decline in popularity only continued in the years that followed.81 By the end of the 
18th century the beast-machine controversy had faded out entirely, and consequently 
did not spill over into the centuries that followed. Nevertheless, many of its 
underlying issues and questions, about animal sentience and thought, did continue to 
be the subject of philosophical debates, and remain so even today. Which brings us 
back to the question raised at the start of the paper, namely: can the arguments of the 
beast-machine controversy serve as a useful resource for philosophers today?
At first glance it might seem that a negative answer should be given, since 
virtually all of the arguments we have examined seek to prove the existence or non-
existence of the animal soul, whereas contemporary debates are typically about 
whether animals are capable of thinking, or feeling pain, or enjoying consciousness, 
and not about whether animals have a soul or some other metaphysical component 
that would grant them such capabilities.82 So it is tempting to suppose that the debate 
about the nature of animals has simply moved on, and that as a result the dialectical 
thrusts and parries of the beast-machine controversy are now of historical interest 
only. 
It would be wise to resist such a hasty judgement, however. While it is true 
that some of the arguments we have considered would be of little relevance to 
contemporary debates, for the reason already identified, this is by no means true of 
all. In fact, some of the arguments clearly do have application today. For example, 
the argument from divine justice seems to pose a problem for the theist who would 
say that a just God granted animals sentience, such that they can feel pain and suffer, 
despite not having deserved it, nor having any prospect of future recompense. 
Indeed, it is for this reason that theistically-minded philosophers have started to take 
seriously the need for animal theodicies;83 without one, a theist seems committed to 
saying either that God is not just, or that animals are not sentient.84 The argument 
from divine justice thus needs to be taken seriously by contemporary theists. In 
addition to that, I see no reason why the argument from divine glory #2 and, on the 
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other side, the argument from superfluous organs and the argument from deception, 
could not be modified so as to be serviceable in the contemporary debates about the 
nature of animals, as none of these needs to be framed in terms of animal souls at all. 
I shall leave it to others to determine whether these arguments should play a part in 
contemporary debates; for our purposes, it is enough to point out that those 
arguments could be so used.
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